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The broad principle of Europeanisation has been a guiding light for the transformation that has taken place in Central Europe (CE) since communist rule began to crumble in 1989. Parties have been formed and developed on western models, and transnational links both with the different party internationals and equivalent associations based on the European Parliament have been instrumental in shaping political identities and underpinning their organisational development. From this point of view the 2004 enlargement emerges as just one further feature in a broad pattern of enhanced western and EU involvement that has prevailed throughout central Europe since the late eighties. The achievements of the CE countries in developing electorally competitive parties and relatively stable party systems have, conversely, played a major part in producing the political situation that made these countries viable candidates for EU membership. Post-communist democracy is now firmly rooted and relatively stable party systems are emerging – albeit to a greater extent in some countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia) than in others.

But the expansion of the EU also brings new factors into play. The dominant Soviet hegemony that prevailed until 1989 was swiftly replaced by a strengthening western influence composed, in its early phase, by a loosely defined idea of ‘transition to democracy’ and considerably more concrete processes of capitalist construction (‘free market’ development) and steadily growing military cooperation. While transnational and US-dominated agencies (IMF, NATO) were particularly active in the early stages of westernisation, the EU became more dominant as a prime agent of external influence as accession agreements were concluded, negotiations got under way, and growing emphasis was placed on the CE countries’ compliance with the acquis communautaire and adherence to the terms of conditionality. The EU increasingly exerted its own, specific form of influence on CE developments. The pace at which EU involvement grew accelerated rapidly in the late 1990s once a firmer commitment to eastern enlargement was made in 1997.

While the idea of enlargement, and partial steps taken towards bringing it about, had been factors in post-communist CE politics since the early days it was only at the Copenhagen EU summit of December 2002 that final agreement on the conditions of enlargement was reached and a date fixed for the accession of eight CE members (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), subject to the successful outcome of referendums in the countries concerned. During the run-up to this decision and in the course of preparations for accession in 2004 clearer signs of the impact of the enlargement process on central European politics and its party systems began to appear. They were particularly marked in Poland where the process of party system development has been most limited. This was a period, too, of relatively intense electoral activity in the region, a context that generally favours the clearer definition of party positions and has a direct effect on the development of party systems. Parliamentary elections were thus held in Lithuania and Slovenia in 2000, Poland in 2001, in Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Latvia (following the order of their being held) in 2002, and in Estonia in March 2003. Lithuania and Slovenia held further parliamentary ballots after elections to the parliament of the enlarged EU in June 2004.

The early impact of EU enlargement on CE politics and patterns of party government seemed, in fact, to be quite severe and often destabilising in its effects. Leszek Miller, Poland’s prime minister, resigned from office on 2 May 2004 one day after his country, in common with seven others in the region, joined the EU. It was, of course, not a direct consequence of EU accession, but EU-related issues had certainly played a part in weakening his position and bringing about a situation in which it could be observed that the country’s ‘whole party system, as it has been formed for the past 15 years, is now in crisis’.​[1]​ The outcome of elections to the European Parliament (EP) held the following month was not favourable for leaders in most other CE countries either. Turnout was uniformly low and those who did vote generally refused to support the existing government. The core party of the Czech governing coalition, the Social Democratic Party, came fifth out of the six groups that succeeded in sending representatives to the EP in Strasbourg and the government collapsed just two weeks later.

The result was less disastrous for Hungary’s ruling Socialists, but they still came in well behind the opposition and the party chairman (who was also foreign minister) soon announced that he would not run for the leadership again. But this was not sufficient to calm disputes within the governing coalition and Prime Minister Medgyessy felt compelled to resign in August. Opposition parties also won in Slovenia while the relatively unknown Lithuanian Labour Party, only founded the previous October, won twice as many votes as any opposition group. The unpopularity of governments in both countries was confirmed by their defeat in national elections in the autumn. Controversy over the nomination of the Speaker of the Latvian Parliament as European commissioner contributed to the instability of the government and its final collapse in October 2004. All in all closer involvement with the EU turned out to be highly destabilising for many CE governments, and it seems reasonable to ask whether its main impact will be to weaken rather than help strengthen party government in the region or consolidate their party systems.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century central Europe is therefore a region of renewed political change. The recent, and ongoing, eastward enlargement is a process that raises new questions about CE party politics and the overall impact of EU involvement as well as providing a new context for the analysis of European politics more generally. But it is only recently that political scientists have begun to focus on the more specific influence of EU involvement, and analyses of the Europeanisation of national parties did not appear until 2002.​[2]​ More recently, publications that focus more specifically on CE developments have begun to appear.​[3]​ This article will extend and develop this area of study in a number of ways. It reviews existing literature on the impact of the EU involvement on west European party systems and relates it to existing studies of CE party systems (2). Following this, the impact of EU integration on recent electoral politics will be examined and the outcome of the 2003 referendums is assessed (3). The special case of Poland is then investigated (4) and some general conclusions drawn about the impact of enlargement and EU involvement more generally on CE party systems (5).

(2)  EU impact on national party systems

Early analysis in fact suggested that the impact of ‘Europe’ on national party systems in the EU was minimal. ‘Of the many areas of domestic politics that may have experienced an impact from Europe’, Peter Mair has argued, ‘party systems have perhaps proved to be most impervious to change’.​[4]​ Europe, it was concluded, has had virtually no direct or even demonstrable effect on the format of the national party systems. Another analysis also found that the core features of the democratic polity across Europe proved to be strikingly resilient to the transformational effects of integration.​[5]​ But other approaches have suggested different conclusions. One has charted how the different European party families have coped with integration issues and examines the ways in which the response of parties has been ‘filtered by historical predispositions’ rooted in the social cleavages that structure competition in west European systems.​[6]​ The impact of Europe in this sense has been pervasive and complex, but by no means direct. More interesting in terms of general political impact is precisely the indirect effect of European governance outcomes on domestic political institutions and input processes in domestic political systems.​[7]​ A different, though complementary, perspective has been suggested by Attila Ágh in a proposal that the Europeanisation of CE parties should be distinguished in its external and internal dimensions. External Europeanisation is understood to be an elite-based process in which contacts with, as well as possible membership of, international party organisations have developed and CE parties’ programmes, values and public discourses have changed accordingly. Internal Europeanisation, on the other hand, is a process reaching down to membership and constituency level in which internal party organisation and popular perceptions are also affected.​[8]​

Moving on from questions of direct and indirect influence, a broader approach identifies five areas of potential investigation of the impact of Europeanisation on political parties in general. They are the areas of: (1) policy and programmatic content; (2) organisation; (3) patterns of party competition; (4) party-government relations; and (5) relations beyond the national party system.​[9]​ It may well be difficult to devise unambiguous measures of the impact of Europe on party change, but consideration of broader and less direct influences must nevertheless be regarded as an important part of the analysis of party development and party system change in the process of enlargement. Early empirical analysis in fact suggests that EU impacts have generally been limited or taken some considerable time to feed into the dynamics of national party competition.​[10]​

But if systematic analysis of the influence of European factors on the parties of long-standing EU member states is still in its relative infancy, this is even truer of the central European parties. Much research remains to be done in this area, but it is at least clear that Europeanisation has been a major factor in CE party development as a general process. From the CE perspective, processes of EU integration have been strong and pervasive throughout a lengthy period that began well before actual accession – Europeanisation was in this sense both adaptive and anticipatory.​[11]​ It has also had further characteristics that are likely to exert a profound influence on how the CE countries will develop within the enlarged EU. Europeanisation in the east has been far more of a top-down affair than it was in the west, while the institutional and policy effects of accession have been more immediate than they were in other parts of the EU. But, although immediate and clearly delineated, it has been observed that the Europeanisation effects may in fact be less profound and that patterns of ‘institutionalisation for reversibility’ are likely to prevail.​[12]​

Consideration of the impact of EU enlargement on the evolving CE party systems raises a number of more specific questions. It is, firstly and most obviously, clear that we are not dealing with long established party systems and some query whether it makes any sense to talk of party systems at all in some CE countries. Sceptical views direct attention to the continuing fluidity of east European political life in this respect and to the problems of identifying party systems where formal conditions of systemness – in terms of party instability and problems of institutional survival – do not really exist.​[13]​ But others take the view that contrasts with western Europe should not be exaggerated. It was argued in a later work that ‘the party systems of East-Central Europe resemble those of Western Europe much more now, in the beginning of the new millenium, than they did in the early 1990’ – and points to the likely effects of the centrifugal and unifying forces of the process of European integration in bringing the region’s party systems yet closer to the ‘European standard’.​[14]​ A more actor-oriented account stressing party dominance of the electoral process, systematic interaction between parties and the emergence of a party-structured government-opposition dynamic left Nick Sitter with little doubt that ‘a developed party system exists in East Central Europe today’.​[15]​

But it is possible – and even likely – that the effects of enlargement may be quite different in central Europe from the impact of Europe on longer established EU members. CE party systems are more fluid than in the west, and there is already a strong tradition of EU influence. The great majority of observers have generally argued from an early date, or even just assumed, that Europeanisation and EU enlargement exercise a major influence on central Europe by fostering political stability and party system development.​[16]​ In broad, if indirect, terms the influence of European integration and the prospect of EU enlargement have been pervasive and so strong that it is virtually impossible to disentangle them from the fundamental processes of democratisation that have dominated much of the political agenda in the region since 1989. This distinguishes the recent, and ongoing, enlargement from all previous ones. Though perhaps not directly apparent in relation to the precise format and mechanics of CE party systems, the influence of European institutions and political models in terms of such factors as integration with international and EU-based party groupings, the careful tailoring of electoral mechanisms to regional norms, and the development of parliamentary procedures according to international practice has been so strong that it is indeed difficult to classify it as just indirect.

European models of party development have clearly been influential, though precisely how is not easy to define. Adopting a European, or generally ‘Western’ orientation, was one way of avoiding a more precise identification of political position in national terms. As Zbigniew Bujak observed when questioned about the stance of the proto-party ROAD in 1990, it was not so much situated on the left or right but was rather ‘West of centre’. Specific European associations were stronger in other cases. The programme of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, the main successor of the former ruling Workers’ Party, thus fulfilled the ‘basic criteria contained in the programmes of European social-democratic parties’.​[17]​ Equally, Solidarity Election Action in its early days was faced with clear developmental choices involving the allocation of a specific role to the trade union within the party, along the lines of the British Labour Party, or to the formation of a federal grouping analogous to the French RPR or UDF.​[18]​ More recently, Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts argued that the country’s party system should more consciously develop on the lines of the general European model and take greater account of European political family networks.​[19]​

Whatever the particular problems involved in analysing the impact of enlargement on CE party systems and identifying its precise consequences, then, it is hardly possible to deny that EU influence has already been extensive in this area.​[20]​ In domestic terms, even if European issues did not impinge directly on party policies and alignments, the question of enlargement and EU membership throughout the 1990s in central Europe was the subject of an overwhelming consensus among the main political parties, groupings and elites. There may well have been different emphases in national parties and differing positions taken by individual politicians, as well as shifts in public opinion (generally towards a lower level of Euro-enthusiasm), but there was nevertheless a strongly dominant mood in favour of enlargement and a degree of commitment to EU membership throughout the 1990s that verged on the willing acceptance of its inevitability. This contingent acceptance of EU integration reinforced and built on the deep-rooted attachment to Europe as a symbol of political community.

It would, though, have been surprising if signs of change had not appeared in this area as eastward enlargement changed from being a broad prospect and medium-term promise and became a practical proposition with potential disadvantages as well as major benefits. An overview of the relatively brief history of party growth and development in the post-communist period has, indeed, also shown it to be an uneven and often turbulent process. EU enlargement may well generate further pressures that impinge on party systems in direct terms with greater strength than during comparable periods in western Europe – possibly to the extent of destabilising the partially formed existing systems and even endangering the level of post-communist democracy achieved so far. From this point of view, as one study has already concluded, the demands of enlargement ‘have both constrained responsive and accountable party competition and…encouraged populists and demagogues’.​[21]​

There is certainly some existing empirical evidence that throws light on possible developments in this area. There are, for example, generally higher levels of support for Eurosceptic parties in the central and east European countries than in existing EU member states, while parties articulating soft Eurosceptic sentiments occupy a more central place in their party systems than those in existing member states.​[22]​ This is a function of the restricted area of political contestation in transition countries already strongly committed to a ‘European’ future which gives any party with a claim to government little freedom of manoeuvre in this area. In view of the solid pro-Europe, pro-Western consensus of early post-communist central Europe, the expression of anti-EU sentiments in the countries of the region is yet more likely to manifest itself in terms of scepticism and the moderation of pro-Europeanism rather than outright opposition.​[23]​ Formal commitment to enlargement is largely inevitable in this context but any broad-based political force will also find it difficult to avoid the emergence of some Eurosceptic tendencies within its own ranks (as the major British parties have also found on more than one occasion). Euroscepticism has also tended to be stronger in countries that were closer to EU membership than those with more distant prospects, these being virtually non-existent for example in Bulgaria. This suggests that enlargement may well have a stronger impact on CE party orientations and the developing configuration of party systems than many have anticipated.

The major implications of enlargement for party system developments therefore point in two quite different directions: while there may well be considerable scope for anti-Europe activity in party systems overall there are no strong prospects of it taking root in parties close to the political centre or in those with reasonable chances of taking part in government. Anti-EU activity is likely to be even less centrally positioned than in western Europe. But this does not mean that enlargement will necessarily promote democratic stability in all cases or serve to consolidate existing party systems. It may well inject new elements of conflict and potential instability into the political system.

(3)  The European dimension in pre-accession elections

A survey of key electoral developments in this area will help provide an introductory view of the impact of EU involvement and associated topics. Pre-accession elections cast light on the state of CE party system development and the role played in it by European issues and groups with a strong interest in questions of enlargement. Amidst a broad regional consensus about Europeanisation and the goal of EU membership, it was in Poland that more conflict and disagreement between the parties over EU issues could be detected than in the other countries of the region.​[24]​ While public support for EU membership fluctuated in all the first-wave candidate countries the change was more pronounced in Poland, where there was a significant decline in Euro-enthusiasm in the last half of the 1990s.​[25]​ By 1999 it was, indeed, possible to identify a Polish party (Polish Accord) that had been founded explicitly to contest membership of the European Union and which, therefore, carried at least the possibility of changing the format of the party system.

More radical changes were seen in the parliamentary elections of 2001, when major shifts in parliamentary representation took place and parties showing not just sceptical attitudes towards the European Union but voicing outright opposition to Poland’s membership won places in parliament. For the first time a party that clearly stated its anti-EU credentials in its manifesto, the League of Polish Families (LPF), won seats with 7.9 percent of the popular vote. As their electoral programme unambiguously put it: ‘As regards accession to the European Union, we shall organise a national referendum and say “no” to a programme of resignation from the sovereignty of the Polish State’.​[26]​ Another major force in this area was Self-Defence (which had dropped its ‘Peasant’ affiliation and successfully broadened its appeal to voters just before the election). Self-Defence was not according to its election literature unequivocally opposed, like the LPF, to Polish accession but declared itself in favour of a referendum and stated, interestingly enough on behalf of the Agricultural Trade Union Self-Defence, that it was ‘against integration with the European Union in its present form’.​[27]​ It came out of the election with 10.2 percent of the vote. The Polish election of 2001 was the first of the CE countries to show such a rise in the parliamentary representation of Eurosceptic forces.

Only in the Polish case, with the formation of the League of Polish Families and the transformation of Self-Defence into a parliamentary force, might it be said that party system format as defined by Mair had been changed with the emergence of CE parties that either stood on an anti-integration platform or clearly articulated anti-EU sentiments.​[28]​ In another case, that of the Czech Communists, a party with a major enlargement dimension and strong Eurosceptic component also strengthened its electoral showing in 2002. A Slovak party, SMER, contested an election the same year for the first time with considerable success and appeared on occasion as the source of views about the re-negotiation of accession conditions that showed some Eurosceptic inclinations, but it hardly seems reasonable to place it firmly in that camp. In electoral terms, the changing format of the Polish party system was reflected in a sharp rise in votes for Eurosceptic parties, a far greater shift (in either positive or negative terms) than that seen in any other CE accession country. Most other countries showed a decline in the vote for Eurosceptic parties (Table 1). It was, nevertheless, a ranking different from the cumulative share of Eurosceptic votes derived from the overall election results.

Such developments in the area of party system change may be summed up in terms of a few tentative conclusions:

–  the changes in the format of the party system can be tentatively linked with weak party system development and higher levels of party system fragmentation in Poland. The effective number of electoral parties in Poland has been higher than in all other CE accession countries and stood at 9.6 compared with 7.5 in Latvia, 7.2 in Estonia, and 6.6 in Slovenia.​[29]​ Poland, it has been argued, has the lowest level of party system development of all the eight CE accession countries.​[30]​

–  Eurosceptic tendencies have continued to be more prominent on the margins of the party system in parties that are non-coalitionable.​[31]​ They have been less apparent in the leading political forces of the political centre that have realistic chances of forming a government or playing a major part in  a governing coalition. 

–  there was more regional differentiation as other Eurosceptic parties lost ground. As one of the main poles, and former centre, of the Slovak party system the Eurosceptic MDS certainly became less influential. EU impact on the coalition potential of the MDS as the discourse of accession came to dominate the arena of party competition and cooperation thus leads K. Henderson to argue that it has led to significant party system change in this respect.​[32]​ The situation was more ambiguous in Hungary and the Czech Republic, where the mainstream parties with some Eurosceptic features either lost power (FIDESZ) or failed to regain it (the Czech Civic Democratic Party), although FIDESZ actually increased its share of the vote in 2002. In the latter cases, too, it should be noted that the rejection of or antagonism towards EU accession was less pronounced than in the case of the new Polish parties.

The weak engagement of the CE electorate in enlargement processes also became evident as the referendums on national accession were being prepared. According to Eurobarometer surveys carried out as early as September and October 2002, low turnout was more likely to threaten a pro-accession outcome than sentiments of EU scepticism.​[33]​ But on the whole Eurobarometer responses provided little clear guidance to referendum behaviour. In general turnout was highest in countries where

Table 1: Votes for Eurosceptic parties 2000-2003 and the shift towards electoral Euroscepticism
     
	    2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	Combined Shift (overall Euro-    sceptic vote in  brackets)
Poland	(         /  7.30)	18.07/18.48			  + 29.25     (36.55)
Czech Republic	(11.00/31.60)		18.5/25.5		  +   2.60     (44.00)
Hungary	(  9.60/42.00)		  7.2/41.9		  –   2.50      (49.10)
Estonia	(  2.43/30.68)			0.55/28.4	  –   4.16      (28.95)
Latvia	(         /27.10)		      / 9.4		  –   7.70        (9.40)
Slovakia	(         /36.10)		     /26.95		  –   9.15      (26.95)
Lithuania	          /  6.94				                      (6.94)
Slovenia	   0.59/  4.38				                      (4.97)

     Note: The identification of Eurosceptic parties is derived from the expert opinions reported in 
     Taggart and Szczerbiak, ‘Party politics’, pp. 29-30. The proportion of votes for hard Eurosceptic
     parties is given first, votes for soft Eurosceptic parties follows the ‘/’. Results of elections held 
     prior to 2000 are given in that column and placed in brackets. Column 6 shows the increase or 
     decrease in the vote for all Eurosceptic parties seen in the last two elections. No elections were
     held in Lithuania and Slovenia prior to accession, so no shift is recorded for those countries.

support for EU membership was weakest and the proportion of those voting for accession was at its lowest (Latvia and Estonia) while, conversely, turnout was lower where EU membership had previously been most favoured (Hungary and Slovakia).

In Poland, where a 50 percent turnout was required to validate the referendum result, there was substantial evidence of tactical voting – i.e. potential anti-accession voters decided not to participate as more effective way of expressing opposition than actually turning out to cast a negative vote.​[34]​ In Hungary, on the other hand, EU membership may well have seemed so inevitable that neither supporters nor those opposed felt it worth casting a vote. The idea that major political issues, including EU enlargement, had been decided in the general election held there the previous year thus seemed to underlie the high rate of abstention. ​[35]​ In Slovenia the EU referendum was held together with that on NATO membership – which was in fact a topic of greater government concern and may well have been the primary focus of attention for some of the more committed Eurosceptics (NATO membership was indeed rejected by more voters than EU accession).​[36]​ One analysis has indeed concluded that popular anti-EU sentiments were generally under-mobilised in most CE countries.​[37]​

In Lithuania some potential Eurosceptics avoided active campaigning in order not to open up divisions in their parties and provoke conflict that might weaken overall political support. Internal party disagreements grew close to producing precisely such splits in Estonia. Against the chair’s advice the congress of the Centre Party, one of the country’s major political forces, finally opted to oppose EU membership although this was not the position of most of the party’s parliamentary faction.​[38]​ Under these conditions some leading pro-EU party figures took a low profile to help maintain party unity. In this context EU enlargement did not emerge as a viable issue for interparty competition but was perceived to be a matter of national interest and a factor liable to disrupt internal party unity. This reinforced the view that Estonian parties (probably little different from most others in the region) were not fully engaged in the accession process and the broader move to European integration.​[39]​

Anti-enlargement parties did not, therefore, generally play a dominant role either in recent elections or in the accession referendums. The last point may simply reflect the fact that CE citizens have been generally satisfied with the gradual move to EU membership. The evidence suggests, however, that this is not the case. Levels of mass support for the EU’s eastern enlargement have fluctuated and generally declined since the very high level of enthusiasm for EU membership in early 1990s. At the same time popular trust in political parties remains at a relatively low level, party identification is not well developed and both party membership and electoral turnout are tending to decline – from, in many cases, not very high levels at all. One particular reason for the relatively minor impact of EU enlargement on CE party systems might therefore be the limited development of the party systems themselves and their restricted capacity to represent the views of national electorates. In some ways CE parties already inhabit the political space into which the more evolved western parties have recently been seen to move: their prime affiliation lies more with the state than in civil society, their role is more procedural than representative, and the degree of partisan identity remains weak.​[40]​ 

But in others there are signs that the brief experience of central Europe in terms of political processes involving the EU is already taking a rather different form from that of west European countries during earlier stages of EU enlargement. The low CE turnout in the 2003 referendums, for example, contrasts quite significantly to a western syndrome of high participation with quite low support for EU membership, the recently seen CE variant is one of low participation and high support – i.e. ‘passive citizenship and a high virtual support of a less politicized, less articulated (therefore, less divided) society’.​[41]​ The Euroscepticism of conservative Polish nationalists also embodied a position of political passivity, weak opposition and grudging acceptance rather than robust opposition and active rejection of EU membership. Issues arising in the context of enlargement may therefore have confirmed and exacerbated existing tendencies rather than bringing new political factors into play.

Elections to the European Parliament (EP) in June 2004 also reflected established European experience to a large extent. Turnout was low, European issues were prominent by their absence, and where voters did exercise their rights they used the opportunity in almost all cases to register their dissatisfaction with the incumbent government (the exception here being that of Slovakia). But the choice that faced the electorate was not always as clear-cut or predictable in domestic terms as voters might have expected. Parliamentary elections had been held just the previous year in Estonia, but by June 2004 voters were faced with a ‘fast and impressive shift of rhetoric by most of the mainstream political actors’, while prominent former Eurosceptics decided to run under the labels of known pro-EU parties.​[42]​

National elections held soon after those for the EP did not always follow the path that voters had seemed to choose in June, either. A newly formed Labour Party in Lithuania won 30.2 percent of the EP vote and went on to gain 28.6 percent nationally four months later. But in Slovenia New Slovenia topped the EP list with 23.6 percent of the vote, but then received 9.0 percent nationally just a few months later. New Slovenia had been formed in 2000 when it won 8.6 percent of the vote, remarkably similar to the 9.0 percent it got in 2004. The difference for the EP elections was, it seemed, made by former prime minister Peterle who had more recently applied his efforts to work at the European level and immediately helped raise the party’s poll ranking when it was announced that he would head the New Slovenia EP list.​[43]​ A strong showing in the EP elections was by no means a domestic party asset, though, as successful politicians then moved straight out of the national arena to the European level.

(4)  The European issue in Polish politics

Overall, then, Poland emerges as the CE country where EU issues seemed to have the greatest, or indeed, only direct influence on party systems in terms of their format. The impact of EU involvement, whether positive or negative, was far more moderate in all other countries where elections were held after 2000. Comparing policy platforms and the manifestos of electorally successful parties in Poland from 1997 to 2001 a clear shift in the range of policies can be seen as well as signs of a definite impact of enlargement and integration issues on the mechanics of the party system. The pattern of parliamentary support for accession changed significantly. The party that showed most enthusiasm for Polish entry, the Freedom Union (FU), did not receive enough votes in 2001 to overcome the threshold and lost all parliamentary representation, while parties with Eurosceptic views either entered parliament for the first time (notably the League of Polish Families and Self-Defence) or strengthened their line on the issue of Polish accession. The collapse of Solidarity Electoral Action, the former governing party, prior to the election as well as the failure of FU to gain any seats left scope for other right-wing forces to make their mark.  The particular configuration of the Polish party system at this time, with marked weakness and fluidity on the right, thus presented anti-enlargement parties as well as those with a more ambiguous political identity with political space in which to manoeuvre.​[44]​

The salience of European issues and the relative importance of EU involvement across the range of policy priorities were, however, other things. EU-related issues may well have been related to the striking changes in the party composition of the Polish Sejm that took place in 2001 and the transformation of the country’s party system, but they were not necessarily prominent in the hierarchy of issues identified as important by voters. Before the election between only 4 and 7 percent of voters identified EU membership as a key determinant of party choice. In terms of issue ranking it came tenth out of seventeen, or seven out of seven in another survey. These findings tend to support the view that much of the impact of membership and issues of EU involvement even in Poland has been not just indirect but also exerted an influence that was at best a moderate one on the configuration of the Polish party system. The League of Polish Families may indeed be the party with the most distinctive anti-EU views, but this was less of a value-commitment in its own right than an aspect of a stronger and more inclusive commitment to the national role of the Catholic Church. Anti-EU sentiments were actually stronger amongst Self-Defence and Peasant Party supporters, but these parties’ overall view of EU enlargement was more nuanced and linked with other aspects of national development. All this suggests that any comprehensive assessment of the impact of EU involvement will be remarkably difficult to arrive at. 

The electorate is, of course, also differentiated in many ways apart from its support for different political parties and its propensity to vote for them. Apart from standard categories like sex, age, occupation, place of residence, etc. a recent study directs attention to a division in Polish society in terms of national identity. This distinguishes between those who feel only Polish and not European (‘exclusive identifiers’) and others who feel both Polish and European, or more European than Polish (‘dual identifiers’).​[45]​ The distinction is also associated with wealth, age, rural origin and broad traditional vs. modern attitudes. But just as striking is the general lack of articulateness of exclusive identifiers and the weak attachment to any opinions they might espouse – relevant in this context, of course, because we are here talking of one of the constituencies likely to be most opposed to enlargement and Polish membership of the EU. In term of anti-EU protest they belong more to ‘the Trappist Tendency rather than the Militant Tendency’, their attitudes to the EU characterised more by weak opposition and grudging acceptance rather than robust rejection. On similar lines the Self-Defence voters have been characterised as ‘lacking ideology or firmly held political convictions…it is an electorate that is socially and politically passive’.​[46]​

To the extent that party systems will also be affected by voter perceptions of their changing social and international environment, which will then influence electoral behaviour, the impact of enlargement may indeed be an indirect one evoking limited but also unpredictable political responses. The impact may well have been limited and EU issues well down the list of voter priorities in the Polish electoral context, but they are certainly factors of some significance that can be rapidly mobilised in a situation where the party system is still in flux and voting outcomes highly uncertain. Centre parties with aspirations to government, whether oriented to left or right, have little choice but to follow the European path but anti-EU parties (which may be more difficult to place on the left-right spectrum) are subject to fewer limitations in this respect, and this also contributes to the development of political uncertainty. They are often reluctant to define themselves in these terms, as widespread confusion over the identity of Self-Defence has also showed.

To the extent that Self-Defence could convincingly be identified as a left-wing force however, albeit one with limited democratic credentials,​[47]​ this therefore served to further weaken the identity and undermine the left-wing credentials of the governing Union of the Democratic Left. By the end of the first quarter of 2003 three new left-wing parties had already been formed in response to a growing perception that the UDL was a force more of the centre-right than centre-left.​[48]​ If European integration has, in terms of indirect impact, encouraged the ‘hollowing out of competition’ between parties – particularly those with real prospects of electoral success and a capacity for government formation – and contributed to ‘the notion of irrelevance of conventional politics’ in western Europe, such effects can only be more pronounced in the CE accession countries.​[49]​ The strict imposition of Maastricht principles and other aspects of conditionality on the new EU members (no chance of the optouts obtained by some western states here) means that governments have very limited scope for manoeuvre.​[50]​ The scope of enlargement for ‘creating disillusionment when democratic attitudes have not fully taken root’ may well be quite considerable.​[51]​

Equally, the configuration of national party systems and the standing of individual party leaders can have a strong influence on the behaviour of representatives of the CE accession states in EU fora. The debâcle of the December 2003 Brussels conference and the failure at that stage of the EU constitution-making process owed a certain amount to Polish intransigence, which was in turn shaped by the notable degree of unpopularity of the Miller government domestically and the weakening position of his party within the national party system. It also, of course, reflected a pattern of behaviour well entrenched in the established EU member states where attempts are made to compensate for national weakness by grandstanding on the international stage (although it seems that Miller was very much a neophyte in this area and fell into a trap prepared by Chirac and Schröder). Such an approach to the problem of EU governance provided some indication of how far CE politics and leadership dynamics had become subject to a degree of Europeanisation. Party developments in Poland were soon to show, however, just how superficial and even potentially destabilising any such Europeanisation might be in terms of its effects on domestic politics. Popular support for the UDL and for Miller personally continued to plummet and was compounded by a party split in March as a significant faction decided to set up a more clearly defined social democratic party. Having resigned the party leadership Miller then announced his departure as prime minister immediately after Poland’s accession to the EU.

One line of explanation for the party’s rapid decline drew attention to the growing discrepancy between its international European image and a domestic political practice that was more relevant to the maintenance of its conventional organisational base. Effective Europeanisation indeed seemed indeed to involve the capacity to ‘speak European’ – but this was a talent to be deployed mostly in Brussels and successful ministers had also to nurture their domestic roots and ‘develop the skill of holding two diametrically opposite views at the same time’.​[52]​ While UDL might well have been quite successful in adapting externally to the European party model, satisfying criteria for membership of the Socialist International and joining the Party of European Socialists, attention was also turned to the negative effects of its attachment to old political habits in terms of domestic organisation and internal processes. Signs of the growing ‘polonisation’ of the party in terms of its factionalism and growing internal squabbles were pointed to in this context.​[53]​ It was also claimed that UDL continued to cling to the organisational legacy of the former PUWP and, quite simply, maintained the dominance of the old communist apparatus. The downfall of UDL was thus defined as the real end of post-communism in Poland and, it was pointed out, ‘the coincidence in time with entry of our country to the EU strengthens and may well perpetuate this effect’.​[54]​ But alternative analysis focused less on the party’s organisational nature and more on shifting support patterns in the electorate.​[55]​

It was in this context that popular support for Self-Defence, generally regarded as an avowedly anti-EU force, continued to rise and in April 2004, for the first time, recorded 29 percent support making it the most popular party in Poland. As the country was now effectively without a prime minister and it was by no means sure that any successor from UDL would be able to secure a parliamentary majority, this meant that the populist anti-EU party now seemed to have a real chance of winning an election that might have to be called before the full tenure of the existing legislature was run (although later polls suggested that this lead was only temporary and the threat of early elections receded).​[56]​ Despite the fluidity of the party system – nothing very new in the Polish context – it did seem that fundamental change was under way in this area. One view was that changes during 2003 had brought about the diminution of the culture/value aspect of party identity – mostly reflected in attitudes to the Church and views of the communist period – as the basis for a fundamental cleavage. Precedence was now taken by the hitherto subsidiary socio-economic cleavage defined by conflict between supporters of a free market economy and those favouring the ‘social state’ with substantial interventionist powers.

This division was now represented by two distinctively post-communist forces – Civic Platform in the first instance and Self-Defence in the second.​[57]​ Again, EU issues were related to this development but appeared to play a role that was subsidiary to the dominant socio-economic cleavage. The capacity of the EU issue to act as a realigning issue through this particular kind of linkage has also been suggested by A. Szczerbiak.​[58]​ The impact of EU involvement on this apparent reconfiguration of the Polish party system was nevertheless limited and by no means direct. But by the time the EP elections were held in June, in which LPF made a particularly strong showing and came second, some thought that the situation had already changed again and that the socio-economic polarisation between Civic Platform and Self-Defence was giving way to one between Eurosceptics and Euroenthusiasts.​[59]​ Change both in party strength and in the interpretations made of it seemed to be the only constant. The position of the UDL had indeed been fatally weakened, but the features of any new, emerging party system in Poland were still unclear. One area in which the impact of Polish involvement in the EU was both surprising and strong was that of agricultural incomes – which rose significantly in the months following Poland’s accession. In September 2004 former Prime Minister Cimoszewicz predicted that the most obvious consequence of EU membership would be a slump in support for Self-Defence. ​[60]​ 





Analysis of the impact of EU involvement on the party systems of established member states, the results of recent elections and the outcome of referendums in the enlargement countries all shed light on CE party dynamics at a crucial stage of political change and provide the means to make some assessment of the early impact of EU involvement on CE party systems. The principle of European integration and promises of EU enlargement were major components of the process of post-communist change and democratisation that got under way in 1989. The prospect of EU membership for the countries of central Europe remained stubbornly distant for much of the 1990s, though, and it was only towards the end of the decade that CE party systems showed any sign of a structural response to the possibility of enlargement. In this they were not out of line with experience in the established member countries of the EU where, it has been argued, the impact on national party systems has been strictly limited. Even when signs of an institutional response did begin to emerge, it was only in Poland that parties representing organised Eurosceptic tendencies emerged and most elections held in the region after 2000 suggested that EU involvement had little direct impact on the developing party systems.

Several general conclusions can be drawn from these developments:

–	major parties lying close to the centre of CE party systems and having government experience, or enjoying some reasonable prospect of entering government in the near future, have been strongly in favour of enlargement and nearly all committed to continuing European involvement. Slovakia was something of an exception to the general rule – and the support its government received in the 2004 EP elections was a likely reflection of this;
–	parties opposing EU involvement or expressing Eurosceptic sentiments have mostly been those on the margins of party systems, either because they are small in size or have relatively low coalition potential (Poland’s LPF and Self-Defence, the Czech Communist Party);
–	marginal parties can therefore derive greater political benefit from an anti-EU position and are less constrained from tapping the sceptical views wide-spread among the electorate; when such tendencies emerged in major parties (in Estonia and, to some extent, Lithuania) they were quickly seen to threaten party unity and steps were taken to counter the threat of factionalism that could threaten the overall position of the party;
–	the particular structure of some party systems (or the weak development of the system as a whole) has offered stronger incentives for parties to take anti-enlargement positions and presented them with particularly low entry costs: the collapse of the ruling Solidarity Electoral Action and Freedom Union in the 2001 Polish election campaign thus presented LPF and Self-Defence with an easy path to parliamentary representation on which they have subsequently been able to build; 
–	the marked weakness of the Polish party system, and the particular failure of right-wing parties to cohere and institutionalise in ways that might challenge or counter-balance the dominance of the Union of the Democratic Left (although this itself evaporated in early 2004), also presented anti-enlargement parties with particular opportunities on the right of the spectrum and opened it up to new political forces. 

Much of the discussion of EU impact has been cast in terms of party systems viewed from the perspective of electoral outcomes and the national referendum results. But CE experience so far, and that in Poland in particular, suggests that EU issues impact on party systems and relations between parties both indirectly and in varied and unpredictable ways, for example by making the problems of coalition maintenance that much more acute. The configuration of national party systems and the standing of individual party leaders have also conditioned their behaviour in critical EU meetings – and vice versa. CE developments direct attention to two major issues that have arisen in the national context during the process of EU enlargement. 

One is the opportunity that this provided for a populist anti-EU party like Self-Defence in Poland, where shifting popular sentiments in early 2004 could have brought it to the brink of power. Reference has been made to the negative conjuncture of growing social fatigue and rapidly declining support for the political establishment that undermined the position of the UDL and boosted the position of Self-Defence. But while more prominent in Poland such tendencies have not been limited to that country. The likelihood that non-traditional and populist parties will be more successful in the post-communist world than in western democracies is linked with the atmosphere of permanent crisis that develops as ‘cycles of disillusion’ become entrenched in some CE countries, a development already documented in Slovakia. This tendency is also associated with the declining capacity of traditional parties to perform their conventional representative functions as processes of contemporary governance become more important – a factor also associated with the increasing precedence that EU institutions and procedures are taking over national politics in the region.​[63]​ As part of the growing prominence of governance over established patterns of co-ordination and political rule in general, indeed, European integration is widely understood to be responsible for a loss of responsiveness on the part of traditional intermediary institutions and organisations – and, particularly, of political parties.​[64]​

A second issue that arises in the Polish context is just why the UDL, for some time regarded as a fully transformed communist-successor party and the only solid pillar of an otherwise shaky Polish party system, experienced a process of such rapid decline and has now seemed to follow the path of other once dominant national political forces. One useful avenue for analysis may well be the distinction between external and internal Europeanisation introduced by Ágh and outlined earlier in this paper.​[65]​ Polish developments in this area also reflected an unexpected coincidence of old regime legacies and the relics of communist rule with the strengthening influence of processes of European integration. The impact of the EU on what follows this ‘end of post-communism’ now becomes a key factor in the analysis of further stages of political development.

One aspect of EU–national party system relations that both issues seem to point to is that of political instability and the growing possibility of unpredictable outcomes emerging in the region rather than the progressive anchoring of the new CE regimes in a more integrated Europe. Consolidation of the recently established democratic order within an existing supra-national institutional framework may not turn out to be the main consequence of EU involvement. As noted at the outset, the formal enlargement that occurred in May 2004 was in some ways just a further feature of the broad pattern of regional relations that has affected central Europe since 1989. A specific question that arises in this context is precisely what enlargement contributes to this situation and how it might have changed the pattern of EU influence exerted over the region since the end of Soviet dominance.

Analysis of the impacts of EU involvement on CE party systems thus raises a number of complex issues and directs attention to a range of diverse interrelations with multiple associations. When attention is turned to the longer established members of the EU in western Europe it is often concluded that EU involvement has had no discernible impact on party systems and that EU politics operates on a different, and largely separate, level from that of national party activity. There have been suggestions that this might also be largely true of central Europe. While there was virtually unanimous formal endorsement and public approval of closer involvement with EU structures and processes for much of the 1990s, there seemed to be little close engagement with any of the practical issues involved or much progress beyond a largely symbolic endorsement of European identity and its presumed benefits. Analysis within the Mair framework of CE party performance on the basis of election results prior to the 2004 enlargement does not show any EU impact much greater than that found in western Europe. Only in Poland and on the basis of the 2001 election did EU involvement seem to evoke some response within the party system.

On the face of it, this seems to be a strange conclusion to reach. Immediately after the end of communist rule CE parties, soon after their birth in many cases, developed close and productive relations with EP party groups, international party associations and many national parties. There was clearly a significant level of impact in terms of personal exchanges, financial and technical assistance, and guarantees of democratic status (legitimation through acceptance by EP or international party groups, for example). EU influence was certainly not absent or negligible. An overall assessment of EU impact, particularly at a general level and in terms of national party systems, is nevertheless not easy to reach. The problem here then may be less one of empirical analysis – was there any political impact or significant influence? – than that of methodology and conceptual approach: how should any such impact be properly conceived and how should influence be gauged? In effect, the problem lies in the old social science conundrum of causality and of how any discrete outcome can be accounted for amidst a vast range of mutual influences and interlocking relations. The seemingly obvious fact that EU involvement must have had some impact on the development of CE democratic party life (along the lines of the indirect influences that Mair thought it impractical to start exploring) does not necessarily make that problem any easier to solve. 

Some guidance in terms of causality and the part played by facilitating conditions in the exercise of EU influence may be derived from the Polish case, suggesting the signal importance of the domestic situation and conditions of national receptivity. A prime factor here is the high level of party system fluidity and the particular lack of firm structures on the right. Specific reasons have been offered for this course of development (or lack of it).​[66]​ They direct attention to a number of factors, and notably:

	the communist legacy and its role in the transition process;
	the transition mode and the stance of major party actors;
	overall dynamics of the democratisation process.

The fate of the Union of the Democratic Left, until 2004 one of the few features of party stability in Poland’s political landscape, introduces some new factors into this situation as well as drawing attention to the overall dynamics of post-communist development. Some impacts of EU involvement may be brought into the picture here, like the restricted scope for manoeuvre of a left-wing party under conditions of EU conditionality and the relative neglect of its domestic base in favour of a stronger European emphasis in terms of post-communist party development. But the question then arises why the rather similar Hungarian Socialist Party did not encounter the same problems.

Domestic conditions in Poland were also conducive to forming an electorate highly sensitive to EU-related concerns. The survival of a large, traditional farm sector was of considerable significance in an EU context where agricultural issues were strongly prominent and remained a source of continuing international dissension. While Self-Defence gathered political momentum as Poland grew closer to becoming a member of the EU it was clearly relevant that the party drew a disproportionate number of its votes (nearly three times the national average) from the farming population. The particular role of the Church and national issues in Polish national life also provided a ready pool of Europhobic League of Polish Families voters as accession drew closer. Of the four Europeanisation scenarios proposed by Bartolini then, it is really only Poland that fits the conditions he outlines in terms of the internalisation of a pro/anti-European cleavage.​[67]​
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